

# Authoritarian Attitudes, Democracy, and Policy Preferences among Latin American Elites

**Daniel Stevens** Hartwick College  
**Benjamin G. Bishin** University of Miami  
**Robert R. Barr** University of Mary Washington

*This article examines the prevalence and consequences of authoritarian attitudes among elites in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. We focus on the connection between antidemocratic elite attitudes and support for democracy; the causes and effects of authoritarian attitudes among elites and their implications for authoritarianism; and the impact of authoritarian attitudes beyond social policy preferences to other policy areas that have indirect implications for order. Contrary to some of the literature, we find that antidemocratic attitudes affect elites' support for democracy. Our analysis also speaks to the debate on the origins of authoritarianism. Much of the evidence supports Altemeyer's notion that perceived threat raises levels of authoritarianism, rather than Feldman's contention that threat strengthens the influence of authoritarian attitudes. Finally, we demonstrate that there is a broader influence of authoritarian attitudes on economic policy preferences, but only where those policies appear to have implications for social order.*

It can intimidate politicians, journalists, and religious leaders who might otherwise oppose repression. It can elect a dictator into office, as it did most notably in Germany in 1933. It can encourage a bold, illegal grab for power, as it did in Italy in 1922, and has violently done in so many other places since. (Altemeyer 1996, 8)

The acceptance of democratic values is a necessary precondition for democracy. While Latin America has seen a great deal of progress toward a norm of democratically elected civilian governments over the past few decades, questions remain about the extent to which democratic values have been internalized. For instance, a recent United Nations Report assessing the opinions of elites and citizens in 18 Latin American countries found that “democratically elected governments have not yet satisfied the political, social and economic aspirations of Latin Americans” and that a majority would support an authoritarian regime that could resolve their country's economic problems (United Nations Development

Programme News Bulletin 2004). Such findings are immensely important because democracy is thought to be less likely to prosper in a nation where those holding the levers of power are ambivalent toward its merits.

This article employs an original survey to examine the prevalence and consequences of authoritarian attitudes among elites in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. We surveyed a broad range of elites, drawn not only from the government sector but also from academia, business, and the media, lending our results additional external validity. Moreover, we examine the psychology of authoritarianism in the transitional democracies of Latin America rather than the established regimes of North America, the focus of most previous research. We are thus able to assess the extent to which conventional wisdom regarding authoritarianism may be a consequence of research design (student subjects) or cultural specificity, as well as providing a descriptive portrait of elite authoritarianism in Latin America.

We explore aggregate levels of authoritarian aggression—“hostility directed at those who are seen

---

Daniel Stevens is assistant professor of political science, Hartwick College, One Hartwick Drive, Oneonta, NY 13820 (stevensd@hartwick.edu). Benjamin Bishin is assistant professor of political science, 314 Jenkins Building, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124 (bishin@miami.edu). Robert Barr is assistant professor of political science and international affairs, University of Mary Washington, 1301 College Avenue, Fredericksburg, Virginia 22401 (rbarr@umw.edu).

Thanks to Stanley Feldman, Barbara Geddes, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are the authors' alone.

*American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 606–620

©2006, Midwest Political Science Association

ISSN 0092-5853

to threaten the social order” (Feldman 2003, 67)—a dimension of authoritarianism. We then analyze the effects of individuals’ authoritarian dispositions on support for the nation’s order-maintaining institutions, such as the police, and for more authoritarian government. In addition, we examine our findings’ implications for Altemeyer’s (1981, 1988, 1996) and Feldman’s (2003) competing explanations of authoritarianism. Finally, we explore the effects of authoritarian attitudes in the hitherto neglected realm of economic policy preferences, as opposed to those for order, to determine whether they have a wider range of effects; our question is whether authoritarianism’s influence is confined to preferences with direct implications for social order or whether it extends to preferences with indirect implications for social order.

Our article contributes to three literatures. First, there is some dispute about the tie between elite values and elite support for democracy. Studies of another basic democratic value, political tolerance, suggest that there may be a disconnect: perception of threats from outgroups and harboring antidemocratic sentiments are not necessarily associated with a weaker commitment to democracy (Duch and Gibson 1992; Sullivan et al. 1993). On the other hand, theories of authoritarianism are often equally adamant about a negative relationship between the prevalence of authoritarian traits, especially among elites, and the commitment to democracy (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1996). In our analysis, we do not find a disconnect between antidemocratic dispositions and attitudes toward democracy.

Second, in the debate about the nature of authoritarianism some scholars regard authoritarianism as a socially learned personality trait (Altemeyer 1996) while others attribute it to processes such as attachment to an ingroup (Duckitt 1989) or a greater desire for social conformity than for personal autonomy, whose influence on attitudes and judgments is moderated by perceptions of threat (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Fromm 1941). Our analysis provides stronger empirical backing for Altemeyer’s explanation. The notion of authoritarianism as a socially learned personality trait is supported by a direct effect of economic threat on levels of authoritarian aggression and effects of levels of authoritarian aggression on attitudes toward order and democracy and toward the economic policy with the clearest implications for social order. Little of our analysis echoes Feldman’s (2003) finding that the *influence* of authoritarian dispositions is stronger under circumstances of economic threat, which provides, “the basis for a wholly different interpretation of the origins and dynamics of authoritarianism” (Feldman and Stenner 1997, 746). There is weak evidence

of such an influence on one variable, but its connection to the desire for social control is unclear.

We also deepen understanding of the effects of authoritarianism. Research on authoritarianism concentrates on its relationship with preferences for order, conformity, and punitiveness, attitudes such as prejudice, or values such as child rearing. Studies of the effects of authoritarianism have been limited to examining their preferences for social order and conformity. We contend that this view is too limited. Authoritarianism’s influence will extend beyond the social policy domain if there is a connection between the policy and order. We compare economic policy preferences for which there is a connection to social order, such as avoiding high unemployment, and where the connection is tenuous, to see, first, whether there is any influence at all and, second, whether it varies depending on the clarity of the connection.<sup>1</sup> We show that there are effects of authoritarian attitudes on economic policy preferences.

## The Importance of Elite Attitudes to Democracy

The definition of elites that informs our research is advanced by Eldersveld: they “hold important positions, [who] have influential roles and [who] exercise important functions in the polity” (1989, x; see also Burton, Gunther, and Higley 1992; Putnam 1976). Elites’ values and behavior reflect the health of a nation’s democracy in two ways. First, in Dahl’s (1971) discussion of democracy, or “polyarchy,” elites are critical because polyarchy becomes likely only after elites establish patterns of political competition and can assume the reins of government without fear of violence or extermination. Thus, elite values are important in establishing norms of democratic conduct. Studies that compare the democratic values of elites to those of the wider population in democracies generally find elites to be more committed. According to Sullivan et al., when it comes to comparing political tolerance among elites and citizens “most research shows greater elite tolerance to be the rule” (1993, 52; but see Duch and Gibson 1992). For instance, national legislators in Britain, Israel, New Zealand, the United States (Sullivan et al. 1993), and Nicaragua (Stein 1998) are more tolerant than the general public (see also Stouffer, McClosky, and Brill 1983 and Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982). This conclusion is not surprising, at least

<sup>1</sup>Adverse economic times raise levels of authoritarianism (Sales 1973). Our question is slightly different: whether authoritarian attitudes influence individuals’ economic policy prescriptions.

in the developing countries, given Lipset's finding of "the profoundly antidemocratic tendencies in lower-class groups" (1981, 121).

The second respect in which elite values are critical to democracy is in their effects on the mass population. Several studies of democratic regimes have shown that citizen values and behavior are profoundly affected by the messages emanating from elites (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Hill and Hurley 1999; Zaller 1992). On national issues in the United States, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) argue that the influence from elites to citizens is much stronger than the reverse. Zaller concludes that "the shift in mass attitudes roughly coincides with the shift in elite attitudes" (1992, 11). And Carmines and Stimson (1989) demonstrate that a realignment among party elites on civil rights caused a similar repositioning of the citizenry.

Our survey of elites allows us to directly examine the first issue of elite values but not the second, regarding the relationship between the messages emanating from elites and the democratic values of the general population. Nevertheless, in knowing more about the kinds of attitudes held by elites in these countries we provide some indirect evidence concerning the possible impact on ordinary citizens.

## The Nature of Authoritarianism

Questions of the prevalence, origins, and implications of authoritarian attitudes have vexed political scientists since World War II. Psychological- and anthropological-based studies sought to explain variations in the "national character" across countries. Adorno et al (1950), for instance, developed the influential notion of the "authoritarian personality," a series of traits that grow as a result of childhood experiences. The rise of survey methods in the 1950s and 1960s provided additional evidence of variation in attitudes among countries, as well as the impact of social class and education. In their groundbreaking study, Almond and Verba (1963) demonstrated the variation among the "civic cultures" of England, Germany, Italy, Mexico, and the United States and showed that attitudes in Mexico were not supportive of democracy.

Unfortunately, such surveys in Latin America were only sporadic until the 1990s. As a result, there is a relative dearth of rigorous cross-national survey research for the region. Nevertheless, ethnographic studies pursued the topic, suggesting that authoritarian attitudes are a manifestation of Latin America's political culture, its "Iberian heritage" (e.g., Dealy 1977; Veliz 1980; Wiarda

2002). According to this argument, there is a singular political culture throughout the region due to shared colonial and religious legacies. These studies distinguished the regional character of Latin America from the industrialized West.

The rapidly increasing availability of survey data for the region has led to empirical studies that raise substantial doubts about the cultural singularity and the extent of authoritarian attitudes espoused in the earlier works. For instance, Power and Clark's (2001) study of Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico shows that, from their individual-level analysis, most of the variance in attitudes can be explained by national origin. A Costa Rican is much more likely to have a high civic orientation, they argue. Such studies highlight national, rather than regional, attributes, while still implying that authoritarian attitudes are a function of political culture.

Political psychologists also disagree about the sources of authoritarian attitudes. According to Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) authoritarianism is a socially learned cluster of attitudes: submission to authorities, adherence to established social conventions, and a general aggression, particularly against perceived nonconformists or threats to the preferred regime. Feldman and Stenner (1997) and Feldman (2003) contend that Altemeyer misconceives the role of threat. Altemeyer suggests that threat mediates the impact of authoritarian predispositions, while Feldman and others (e.g., Rickert 1998) demonstrate that perceptions of threat moderate authoritarian predispositions. In other words, contrary to Altemeyer's account, it is not that levels of authoritarianism rise under conditions of threat but that the relationship between authoritarianism and various political attitudes and behaviors strengthens. Feldman and Stenner (1997) and Feldman (2003) see this as more consistent with an explanation in which authoritarians are individuals with a pessimistic view of human nature, which may or may not be socially learned, and have either a desire for conformity to group norms based on attachment and identification with the group, or on the degree to which *others* are seen as having different social norms. It is unlikely therefore to be a personality trait, since the strength of the relationship between a personality trait and attitudes or behavior should not be moderated by short-term variation in perceptions of threat.

Whatever the origins, the prevalence of authoritarian attitudes is frequently assumed to have negative consequences for democracy. This may be the case because authoritarians are "easily frightened, which makes them vulnerable to precisely the kind of overstated, emotional, and dangerous assertions a demagogue would make"

(Altemeyer 1996, 101).<sup>2</sup> Indeed, many draw a link between values and regime outcomes as well as level of economic development (Harrison 1985; Wiarda 2002). But others reject political cultural determinism, arguing instead that authoritarian regimes result not from ingrained beliefs but from factors such as the nature of capitalist development (O'Donnell 1973; Schmitter 1974) or the choices of political actors (Linz and Stepan 1978). More broadly, Bermeo (1992) suggests that preference for regime type stems from political learning: one's experiences and perceptions of threat.

Our survey data allow us to contribute to these debates. Our analysis accounts for both main effects of authoritarian aggression and for the possibility that authoritarian dispositions are more salient when perceptions of political or economic threat are elevated. We find evidence of a direct relationship between authoritarian aggression and a preference for order, even at the expense of democracy, but little support for the theory that the effects of authoritarian dispositions are moderated by perceptions of threat. In addition, our findings do not support notions of regional political cultural determinism. Individual country differences, on the other hand, are very much apparent, possibly reflecting a combination of unique histories, political cultures, domestic politics, and other short-term factors such as perceptions of the outcomes of the choices of political actors (e.g., economic crises).

## Research Design

Our data are drawn from a unique survey of 537 Latin American elites in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela—the *University of Miami/Zogby Latin American Elite Poll*—conducted in September 2003. At least 80 respondents, from the elite sectors of government, media, academia, and business, were interviewed in each country. Most interviews were in Spanish and in person at the respondents' offices; a few were surveyed by telephone, and the Brazilian interviews were conducted in Portuguese (see Appendix A).

Each of these six countries varies widely on our key explanatory variables. They experienced transitions to democracy at different times and different rates, Venezuela and Colombia having lengthy experiences with democracy while Mexico became a multiparty democracy

only in 2000, along with varying degrees of economic instability, Chile having avoided serious recession in the last decade whereas Argentina had a deep and long depression. Colombian democracy has also faced the most significant recent challenge from extragovernmental actors in the form of paramilitary groups, narco-traffickers, and rebel groups. There are thus common experiences but also important cross-country variance with which to test different explanations of support for democracy and various economic policies.

The Latin American Elite Poll (LAEP) is appropriate for studying the impact of authoritarianism as it both assesses the sources of support for political regimes, formal institutions, and democracy (e.g., Canache 2002; Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994), and the causes of an individual's authoritarian predispositions (Altemeyer 1996; Feldman 2003; Fromm 1941). Political, institutional, and democratic support are examined through retrospective and prospective perceptions of the economy at the personal and the national level, confidence in key national institutions such as the judiciary and the military, willingness to support more authoritarian government, and opinions about economic policy, including support for economic liberalization.

The LAEP uses Altemeyer's eight-indicator "posse against radicals scale" (1996, 29–30), which he describes as "a fairly direct measure of authoritarian aggression" (29), to measure authoritarianism (from now on we refer to authoritarian aggression and authoritarianism interchangeably). Authoritarian aggression covaries with the other two attitudinal clusters of authoritarianism—submission and conventionalism—and thus parsimoniously captures a dimension of authoritarianism. It is also correlated with the characteristics of Feldman's concept of social conformity: "Because the goal of those high in social conformity is to defend common norms and values, they will want the authorities to take actions that punish nonconformists and restrict their ability to challenge those norms" (2003, 67).

Subjects were asked to respond to a series of eight statements about a law passed "sometime in the future" outlawing "radical political groups" in their country on a 9-point scale from "the statement is extremely untrue of you" (−4) to "the statement is extremely true of you" (+4). Thus our authoritarianism scale ran from −32 (least authoritarian) to +32 (most authoritarian) (details are in Appendix B). Cronbach's alpha for the scale is 0.90. It is important to note that the reference to "radical political groups" permits flexibility: a right-wing respondent would likely think of left-wing groups and a left-wing respondent of right-wing groups. In this respect, the scale

<sup>2</sup>Thus the idea is that for some individuals authoritarian dispositions are latent; they come to the surface and are raised by perceptions of threat. It is not personalities that change, in other words, but perceptions of threat.

is not unlike Sullivan and colleagues “least-liked” method of assessing tolerance.<sup>3</sup>

Authoritarianism is associated with antidemocratic values (provided the wrongdoers are not part of the establishment with which the authoritarian sympathizes). According to Feldman, “Authoritarian aggression is the hostility directed at those who are seen to threaten the social order” (2003, 67). Individuals with authoritarian predispositions are more likely to act aggressively, particularly if they believe that their actions have the approval of those in power (i.e., they are safe from retaliation). Consequently, authoritarian aggression is a good measure of the internalization of basic democratic values like tolerance, egalitarianism, and the rule of law.

Our analysis proceeds in the following manner. We begin by examining the degree to which authoritarian attitudes vary across Latin American countries. Next, we explore how individual authoritarian aggression is influenced by individual characteristics and economic and ideological threat. Finally, we examine the extent to which authoritarian aggression conditions attitudes toward democratic values and economic policy preferences.

## Results

### Authoritarianism and Attitudes toward Democracy

The majority of our respondents, 57%, were at least somewhat sympathetic to the rather extreme sentiments expressed in the indicators, while 43% said that all the statements about outlawing radical groups were extremely untrue of them. This is not unexpected among elites in countries with democratic aspirations.<sup>4</sup> Table 1 displays the mean levels of authoritarian aggression in the six nations.

The nation with the most authoritarian group of elites is Colombia, while Brazil, closely followed by Mexico, has the least authoritarian elites. We tested the import of these

<sup>3</sup>Gibson (1992) argues that the alternative “Stouffer-based” measure is as valid as the least-liked method but the least-liked method remains the choice of leading analysts of political tolerance (e.g., Marcus et al. 1995) and in Gibson’s recent work (e.g., Gibson and Gouws 2003). Others additionally contend that reference to a single least-liked group captures the intensity of intolerance toward that group but not the breadth of intolerance toward other disliked groups (e.g., Caspi and Seligson 1983). In our survey we asked about radical *groups*, rather than a single radical group, thereby allowing respondents additional flexibility and giving our measure of authoritarianism extra validity.

<sup>4</sup>Altemeyer (1996) admits that some of his indicators appear extreme at first glance—as though no one could possibly agree with them—yet in exhaustive empirical analysis he has demonstrated that individuals vary in their response to them and that the variation captures an important set of attitudes.

**TABLE 1 Mean Levels of Authoritarian Aggression (−32 = Minimum, +32 = Maximum)**

Country (Number of Respondents)	Mean Authoritarian Aggression
Argentina (80)	−18.85 <sup>B,M</sup>
Brazil (103)	−24.73 <sup>A,CO</sup>
Chile (87)	−22.29 <sup>CO</sup>
Colombia (80)	−15.56 <sup>B,CH,M</sup>
Mexico (107)	−24.21 <sup>A,CO</sup>
Venezuela (80)	−21.94

<sup>A</sup>Mean is significantly different from Argentina’s at  $p < .05$ ; <sup>B</sup>Mean is significantly different from Brazil’s at  $p < .05$ ; <sup>CH</sup>Mean is significantly different from Chile’s at  $p < .05$ ; <sup>CO</sup>Mean is significantly different from Colombia’s at  $p < .05$ ; <sup>M</sup>Mean is significantly different from Mexico’s at  $p < .05$ ; <sup>V</sup>Mean is significantly different from Venezuela’s at  $p < .05$

differences by conducting paired t-tests of all mean scores. The tests indicate that some of the differences in levels of authoritarianism are statistically significant. Colombia, for example, has a significantly different mean than those of the three nations with the lowest levels of authoritarianism (and just misses being statistically significantly different from Venezuela— $p < .07$ ). Thus, despite Colombia’s tradition of stable democracy, its long civil war may have resulted in higher levels of authoritarianism. Argentina, which was emerging from a severe economic crisis when our survey was in the field, has the highest level of authoritarianism after Colombia, and a significantly different mean level of authoritarianism on our scale than Brazil and Mexico.

It may seem surprising in Table 1 that a country such as Argentina, whose economic and political crisis did not result in authoritarian government, has relatively authoritarian elites, or that elites in Venezuela, which was continuing to lurch toward authoritarian government under Hugo Chavez when the LAEP survey was in the field, are no more authoritarian in the aggregate than those from other nations. However, while Argentina’s democracy survived the crisis, it emerged weaker; Freedom House downgraded Argentina from “free” to “partly free” in 2002 and perceptions of corruption in the political and public sectors increased dramatically.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, many of the differences in Table 1 are not statistically significant:

<sup>5</sup>Based on the annual “Corruption Perception Index” from Transparency International (<http://www.transparency.org>), which ranks countries on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being the least corrupt. Argentina fell from 3.5 in 2000 (52<sup>nd</sup> of 102 countries) to 2.8 in 2002 (70<sup>th</sup>). Freedom House rates political rights and civil liberties to categorize countries as “free,” “partly free,” or “not free” (<http://www.freedomhouse.org>).

Argentinean elites are significantly more authoritarian than those in Brazil and Mexico only, and we cannot say that Venezuelan elites are any more or less authoritarian than those from any other nation.

This still begs the question, however, of why Venezuelan elites do not appear to be *more* authoritarian than others. While one might expect a relationship between the authoritarianism of a regime and its elites, different experiences with democracy, “how vigorously governments seek to indoctrinate their citizens and how much access to alternative values their citizens possess” determine the rate at which the relationship develops, as well as its ultimate strength (Geddes and Zaller 1989, 342). Thus, we should not expect the relationship to be one-to-one (e.g., because Venezuela has the most authoritarian government its elites should rank first in authoritarianism). Venezuela had a stable two-party democracy until the 1990s, under which most of our sample would have been socialized. It could therefore be seen as equally surprising, even troubling, that Venezuelan elites are not *less* authoritarian than those from any of our other nations, given the contrast in some of their histories.

Similarly, our survey took place at a single point in time. We cannot therefore ascertain whether there has been *change* in elites’ authoritarianism. We might expect, for example, that Venezuelan elites have become more authoritarian than they were in 1998. When our survey was in the field this made them neither more nor less authoritarian than elites from five other nations. If we surveyed again at a later point in time, with the regime still in place, we may well find that levels of authoritarianism have grown and that Venezuelan elites are now more authoritarian than those in some of the other nations.

We continue by exploring the causes of individual authoritarianism. In our model we specify authoritarian aggression to be a function of country of residence, economic and political threat, ideology, and individual differences such as age (see Appendix B for details). For ease of interpretation we recode authoritarianism to a 7-point scale in which 0 represents the lowest score on the raw scale (−32), while we divide the remaining respondents into six approximately equal intervals of ascending authoritarianism (i.e., “6” represents the highest level of authoritarianism).<sup>6</sup> We use this measure in Tables 2 through 4. We measure country of residence with dummy variables for five of the six countries; Brazil, the least authoritarian nation in the aggregate, is our reference country. Economic threat is operationalized using four

<sup>6</sup>We also ran all the analysis in Tables 2 through 4 with the original 65-point scale. There were no differences of substantive consequence.

**TABLE 2** Determinants of Authoritarian Aggression

Variable	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Constant	.41 (.93)
Countries	
Argentina	1.31 (.33)** B,M
Chile	.93 (.32)** B,M
Colombia	1.46 (.32)** B,M
Mexico	.07 (.32) <sup>A,CH,CO,V</sup>
Venezuela	.96 (.37)** B,M
Threat	
Retrospective egocentric economic perceptions	.20 (.13)
Prospective egocentric economic perceptions	.22 (.12) <sup>#</sup>
Retrospective sociotropic economic perceptions	−.21 (.12) <sup>#</sup>
Prospective sociotropic economic perceptions	−.32 (.12)*
Ideological distance from president	−.27 (.07)**
Ideology	
Ideology	.23 (.07)**
Individual Differences	
Age	.00 (.01)
Female	−.03 (.21)
Education	.13 (.14)
Academic sector	.15 (.29)
Business sector	.31 (.25)
Government sector	−.10 (.27)
R <sup>2</sup>	.15
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.12
n	500

\*\*p < .01, \*p < .05, #p < .10 (two-tailed)

<sup>A</sup>Coefficient is significantly different from Argentina’s at p < .05;

<sup>B</sup>Coefficient is significantly different from Brazil’s at p < .05;

<sup>CH</sup>Coefficient is significantly different from Chile’s at p < .05;

<sup>CO</sup>Coefficient is significantly different from Colombia’s at p < .05;

<sup>M</sup>Coefficient is significantly different from Mexico’s at p < .05;

<sup>V</sup>Coefficient is significantly different from Venezuela’s at p < .05

measures of economic perceptions reflecting prospective and retrospective evaluations of the economy in combination with egocentric and sociotropic. Higher scores indicate increased satisfaction with the economy.

We also assess the impact of Feldman and Stenner’s notion of political threat.<sup>7</sup> However, while they measure

<sup>7</sup>Although they look at its ability to enhance the influence of authoritarianism rather than its relationship with authoritarianism itself.

closeness to four different actors in American politics—the two major parties and the two presidential candidates in 1992—our data only allow us to examine ideological closeness to the president. Feldman and Stenner theorize that authoritarians are threatened by “ideological diversity per se, notwithstanding that there may exist a party and/or candidate whose positions are proximate to their own” (1997, 751). Therefore, owing to this difference, perhaps we gauge political threat less well.

Respondent ideology is a separate explanatory variable because studies such as Altemeyer’s (1981, 1988, 1996) have often found a correlation between authoritarianism and right-wing sentiments. Level of education is our indicator of political awareness; highly educated individuals tend to pay more attention to politics. Finally, we include control variables that account for an individual’s background. These are age, gender, and dummy variables for each elite sector, with respondents from the media being excluded. Table 2 presents the results from this model.

The results are intriguing. Ideology and threat seem to influence authoritarianism, while political awareness and individual background do not. Economic considerations, negative perceptions of national economic prospects, and to a lesser extent negative retrospective perceptions, raise individual elite authoritarianism. In other words, national economic threat affects *levels* of authoritarianism, in line with Altemeyer’s thinking, as well as perhaps making it salient to attitudes to democracy. Individual economic circumstances have little influence on authoritarianism and the weakly significant relationship between prospective egocentric perceptions and authoritarianism implies that personal good fortune is associated with more, not less, authoritarianism. But elites seem more concerned with economic threat at the national level, where pessimism about the future economy enhances their willingness to compromise on civil liberties. Those on the right of the political spectrum are also more authoritarian.<sup>8</sup>

Counterintuitively, however, ideological distance from the president is associated with lower rather than higher levels of authoritarianism. Three interpretations suggest themselves. The first is that for these respondents political threat genuinely diminishes authoritarian sentiment. Given the previously outlined doubts about our

measure of political threat, along with decades of research suggesting the opposite relationship (e.g., Doty, Peterson, and Winter 1991; Lavine et al. 2002; Sales 1972, 1973), we are very skeptical. The second is that for elites ideological distance from the president is not threatening—after all he is also a member of the elite—and that it is economic insecurity that drives authoritarianism. It is worth noting that this also implies that we do not measure political threat well, though for different reasons. However, we are skeptical of this interpretation because it suggests that we should not find a relationship between ideological distance and authoritarianism, rather than find that ideological proximity heightens authoritarianism.

We therefore favor a third interpretation. We described the way in which our measure of political threat gauges distance from the president rather than the ideological diversity that Feldman and Stenner argue discomforts authoritarians. It is possible that our measure was indeed affected by ideological distance being unthreatening to elites. However, and it warrants further investigation, it may be that in our consolidating democracies closeness to the president leads to a sense of efficacy and empowerment that makes the outlawing of radical groups more appealing. Psychological studies of self-efficacy suggest that the more an individual believes an action can be accomplished effectively the more likely he or she is to go ahead with it (Ajzen 1991; Bandura 1977, 1982). Our measure may be capturing an association between proximity to the president and feelings of efficacy better than it does political threat. This enhanced efficacy prompts a greater willingness to restrict the civil liberties of distant groups.

Finally, our model shows that nationality is important—to the right of the coefficients in Table 2 we display the results of Wald tests of the equality of the country coefficients since each country coefficient compares only the difference between that country and Brazil, the omitted category. Even accounting for ideology, a member of Brazil’s elite tends to be less authoritarian than one from Colombia. To be sure, as with Table 1, these significant differences are open to a variety of explanations. For instance, based on Colombia’s experience with leftist and paramilitary groups and perhaps its 2002 election of Álvaro Uribe, whose campaign emphasized law and order, one might expect higher levels of authoritarian attitudes. Brazil, by contrast, has had social problems of a lower order, and by the time of this survey the centrist policies of President da Silva had calmed the concerns of many elites and bolstered public confidence. National cultural differences, as opposed to a singular regional political culture, may also play a role in these results. Such an account would be in line with recent cross-national

<sup>8</sup>There is some controversy about the connection between ideology and authoritarianism. While Altemeyer claims that authoritarian attitudes are largely a right-wing phenomenon, others argue that this is an artifact of scales that do not effectively capture left-wing authoritarianism (LWA). However, the concept of LWA remains in dispute. We use Altemeyer’s “posse against radicals” scale. The bivariate correlation between ideology (where a higher score means more right-wing) and authoritarianism, is an anemic .13, indicating that the scale was effective in capturing the attitudes of left- as well as right-wing respondents.

survey research in the region (e.g., Power and Clark 2001; Seligson 2005). However, we cannot distinguish among these explanations with these data, and a full accounting of the historical, cultural, and contemporary differences among these six countries is well beyond the scope of this article. Clearly, however, the differences in levels of authoritarianism among our subjects are also affected by factors that are country specific, results that require further study.

We now examine the degree to which authoritarianism among elites affects preferences, both on its own and in conjunction with a heightened sense of economic or political threat. In Table 3 we look at its impact on attitudes toward maintaining order through government: levels of confidence in order-maintaining institutions and support for an authoritarian alternative to democracy. To reiterate, the literature on elite values and political tolerance suggests a disconnect between such abstract attitudes toward democracy and actual willingness to support the norms of a democratic regime. The independent variables are identical to Table 2 with the addition of authoritarianism as an independent variable and interactions between authoritarianism and each economic perception and between authoritarianism and an individual's perceived ideological distance from the president of their country. We center authoritarianism and each of these five variables at their respective means to make the main effects of the coefficients more substantively meaningful (see Franzese, Kam, and Jamal 1999). If there is a connection between elite values and democratic attitudes, we expect to see a positive relationship between authoritarianism and a preference for order. If economic and political threat heightens the influence of authoritarianism on attitudes toward democracy and freedom, we should also see positive interaction effects, as others have found (e.g., Feldman and Stenner 1997).

The model in the second column uses ordered probit since the dependent variables are not normally distributed. We treat confidence in order-maintaining institutions, the dependent variable in the first column, a 7-point scale, as interval level data and thus estimate the coefficients via ordinary least-squares regression.

Table 3 shows that authoritarian attitudes have an impact on our two indicators of attitudes toward order through government. As we expected, authoritarianism is associated with more confidence in order-maintaining institutions. We also asked about confidence in additional institutions in each country—the national congress, political parties, media, and the church. In analysis we do not show here, we found that authoritarianism did *not* affect evaluations of these institutions. Thus authoritarian attitudes are associated with a particularized sym-

pathy toward institutions of authority in Latin America rather than with institutions in general. Authoritarian attitudes are additionally related, again as expected, to a greater willingness to support the order of an authoritarian government, as shown in the second column of Table 3.

The coefficients on ideology in Table 3 show that right-wing respondents displayed greater confidence in the order-maintaining institutions of government and willingness to consider an authoritarian alternative to democracy. We see only weak and inconsistent direct effects of perceptions of the economy and ideological distance from the president, while the interaction terms between authoritarianism and these indicators of economic and political threat are insignificant. These count against the notion that an increased sense of threat heightens the influence of authoritarianism on judgments such as those we examine in Table 3.

The absence of a clear economic impact is similar to that found for tolerance by Gibson (1996) in Russia and Ukraine. Preferences for democracy and order among these elites do not appear to be instrumental. We also observe a limited impact of political awareness, as captured by education: more politically aware elites were somewhat less likely to foresee circumstances in which they would support an authoritarian government.

There are, in addition, some interesting differences *between* groups of elites on these questions. Controlling for authoritarian dispositions and ideology, business elites are somewhat more likely to be sanguine about an authoritarian government, while government elites display greater confidence than others in the regime's institutions of order. Thus there is some disunity among elites in these nations on key issues.

The final striking feature of the results in Table 3 is that controlling for a number of individual differences we still find consistent nation effects. As we see with Argentinean and Venezuelan elites, decreased confidence in the institutions of order tends to be associated with weaker support for authoritarian government, where the institutions of order would likely have an enhanced role in the regime.<sup>9</sup> Thus, when we control for authoritarian attitudes and economic and political threat, there is no indication of an additional country-specific impact either of Argentina's economic crisis or Venezuela's controversial government under Chavez. Our evidence suggests quite the opposite, that they may have reduced support in these nations.

<sup>9</sup>The correlation between the two dependent variables in Table 3 is .25.



TABLE 3 Authoritarianism and Attitudes Toward Order in Government

Variable	Confidence in Order-Maintaining Institutions	Support for Authoritarian Government
Argentina	-1.202 (.225)**	-1.471 (.355)**
Chile	.381 (.212)#	.060 (.222)
Colombia	-.242 (.219)	.263 (.218)
Mexico	-.693 (.214)**	.217 (.225)
Venezuela	-1.027 (.246)**	-.852 (.317)**
Retrospective egocentric economic perceptions	.043 (.090)	-.114 (.100)
Prospective egocentric economic perceptions	.134 (.080)#	-.020 (.089)
Retrospective sociotropic economic perceptions	.129 (.080)	.227 (.089)*
Prospective sociotropic economic perceptions	-.023 (.083)	-.080 (.096)
Ideological distance from president	-.081 (.046)#	-.003 (.051)
Ideology	.167 (.044)**	.200 (.051)**
Age	.007 (.006)	.005 (.007)
Female	-.493 (.141)**	-.243 (.168)
Education	-.015 (.092)	-.164 (.103)
Academic sector	.166 (.196)	.367 (.224)
Business sector	.175 (.170)	.361 (.196)#
Government sector	.345 (.182)#	.188 (.217)
Authoritarianism	.125 (.031)**	.114 (.034)**
Authoritarianism × Retrospective egocentric	.036 (.041)	-.028 (.045)
Authoritarianism × Prospective egocentric	.034 (.036)	.030 (.040)
Authoritarianism × Retrospective sociotropic	.016 (.033)	-.002 (.037)
Authoritarianism × Prospective sociotropic	-.018 (.038)	.006 (.043)
Authoritarianism × Ideological distance	.002 (.003)	.012 (.025)
Constant	5.038 (.474)**	
n	494	494
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> /Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.29	.18
Cutpoint 1		1.32 (.52)
Cutpoint 2		3.00 (.55)

\*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ , #  $p < .10$  (two-tailed).

### Authoritarianism and Economic Policy Preferences

Most research on authoritarianism demonstrates a relationship between authoritarian attitudes and preferences for social control, where its influence is most likely to be felt. The impact on policy is that authoritarians favor more punitive laws (Feldman and Stenner 1997); they seek to punish those they perceive as nonconformists or threats to the established order. In addition, Feldman contends that authoritarians may desire *laissez-faire* economic policy while at the same time preferring a firm hand when it comes to social control. His point is that authoritarians' principal desire is for order. This suggests that authoritarian attitudes have little effect on other public policies such

as economic policy.<sup>10</sup> In this section we ask whether there are broader patterns to authoritarian attitudes that extend to other policy preferences where there is a connection between the outcomes of those policies and social order.

<sup>10</sup>There is a large literature on aggregate and individual-level explanations of economic policy in Latin America, including rational choice accounts (Geddes 1994), prospect theory (Weyland 2002), domestic institutional dynamics (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Kay 1999), cultural attitudes (Hojman 1999), ideology (Pereira 1991), domestic crises that lead to popular tensions and discontent (Jameson 2001), interest groups (Smith 1990), and international demands (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991; Johnson and Crisp 2003; Przeworski 1993). Our aim here is not to test such explanations, nor to say that the role of authoritarianism subsumes them, but simply to examine the influence of authoritarianism, in addition, on individual policy preferences.

We examine the causes of support for a prominent government role in providing employment, a redistributive tax policy, and economic liberalization (see Appendix B for coding details). We suspect that there is a clearer connection between employment and social order than there is for tax policy and for economic liberalization. In Latin America and elsewhere, high unemployment and underemployment has been associated with violence and challenges to authority. In late 2001, for instance, a lengthy recession and record unemployment precipitated widespread protests and the collapse of Argentina's De la Rúa administration. Authoritarian attitudes may, therefore, lead to a preference for an active, paternalistic, government role in seeking full employment, as opposed to an alternative over which there is less control such as the market. For the other two variables, however, because the connection to social control is nebulous we expect either a weak or no relationship.

The dependent variables in the first two columns of Table 4 reflect the extent of agreement with two statements on a 4-point scale whose minimum value represents "strongly disagree" and maximum value "strongly agree": "The government should see to it that everyone has a job" and "It is fair to tax the rich to help the poor." Authoritarianism and the five indicators of economic and political threat are again centered at their means.

The first column shows, as we expected, that there is a relationship among our elites between authoritarian attitudes and the belief that the government should ensure that everyone has a job. The relationship is direct and is not moderated by perceptions of economic or political threat. The similarity to the results in Table 3 suggests that this may indeed be an extension of a concern that high unemployment can lead to breakdowns in social order.

The second and third columns of Table 4 are a little different. For these dependent variables, where the implications for social order are less obvious, there is no direct effect of authoritarian attitudes. The first shows, however, that negative retrospective evaluations of personal finances—personal economic threat—render authoritarian attitudes more salient for tax policy. Authoritarians, and it is worth reiterating that our sample had predominantly middle- and high-income individuals, are less likely to believe that this is acceptable policy than nonauthoritarians if their own circumstances have deteriorated. There is also weaker evidence that if authoritarians see a stormy future for the national economy they are *more* likely to believe in taxing the rich to help the poor. However, we should not make too much of a single result. We see no influence of economic threat on the salience of authoritarianism on perceptions of the benefits of economic liberalization or for preferences concerning

the government's role in providing jobs.<sup>11</sup> The weight of evidence in Table 4, as in Table 3, is that perceptions of economic and political threat do not moderate the influence of authoritarianism.

Two implications about authoritarianism are clear from Table 4. First, authoritarian attitudes may have effects beyond preferences for policies that are directly connected to social order. The results of the first model of employment policy suggest that authoritarians' desire for order will result in their wanting a stronger role for government than nonauthoritarians if there are implications for social order, such as high unemployment, perhaps even if prevailing economic wisdom indicated that this was unwise. Second, for the economic policy preferences with a more tenuous connection to social order authoritarian dispositions are of little importance. If they are activated at all it is by personal economic threat, as in the second model of Table 4, more than by national economic threat but we find little role for economic threat in general. Our results suggest that Feldman and Stenner's (1997) argument that national threat activates authoritarian predispositions is specific to the context or culture of the United States or limited to the social attitudes and attitudes toward the use of force that are their focus.

We also find limited effects of economic perceptions more generally. Ideology and working in the business or government sectors are just as important. Both indicate the same effect: right-wing ideology or belonging to one of these nations' business elites leads to antipathy toward redistribution of wealth by taxation and to a more optimistic opinion about the basic interests of employers and employees. Right-wingers also evaluate economic liberalization more positively. Elites in government are less likely to view economic liberalization positively.

Differences based on the country of residence are also present. With its recent economic problems it is perhaps unsurprising that Argentinean elites do not see economic liberalization in a positive light. The same is true of Mexico and Venezuela. We also see that elites in all these nations view the role of government in providing employment differently than those of Brazil.

In all our models in Tables 3 and 4 respondents' national origins have a consistent impact. We have speculated upon its causes but cannot test them with these data.<sup>12</sup> There is one explanation we can examine, however.

<sup>11</sup>We tested to see whether the lack of significance of the interaction terms in our models resulted from multicollinearity by conducting likelihood ratio tests to examine whether the block of interactions explained a statistically significant amount of variance. They did not.

<sup>12</sup>Many of the influences described in footnote 10, for example, will be picked up by the country dummy variables.

TABLE 4 Determinants of Attitudes Toward Economic Policies

Variable	Govt. Should See That Everyone Has Jobs	Fair to Tax Rich to Help Poor	Economic Liberalization Has Been Good
Argentina	-1.301 (.267)**	.198 (.193)	-.535 (.188)**
Chile	-1.619 (.252)**	-.040 (.183)	.562 (.183)**
Colombia	-1.081 (.267)**	.594 (.197)**	-.567 (.182)**
Mexico	-1.090 (.256)**	.220 (.187)	-.255 (.177)
Venezuela	-.577 (.296)#	-.132 (.208)	-.436 (.207)*
Retrospective egocentric economic perceptions	-.052 (.091)	.027 (.078)	-.064 (.076)
Prospective egocentric economic perceptions	-.087 (.081)	.010 (.071)	.027 (.066)
Retrospective sociotropic economic perceptions	.192 (.086)*	.063 (.069)	.042 (.069)
Prospective sociotropic economic perceptions	-.013 (.085)	.247 (.072)**	.143 (.071)*
Ideological distance from president	.042 (.047)	.036 (.040)	-.029 (.039)
Ideology	-.025 (.045)	-.108 (.039)**	.154 (.038)**
Age	.012 (.006)#	.003 (.005)	-.004 (.005)
Female	.221 (.146)	-.066 (.123)	-.262 (.117)*
Education	-.165 (.097)#	-.041 (.080)	.079 (.078)
Academic sector	.162 (.203)	-.088 (.174)	-.249 (.164)
Business sector	-.033 (.171)	-.457 (.148)**	.078 (.144)
Government sector	.059 (.185)	-.185 (.159)	-.303 (.151)*
Authoritarianism	.068 (.031)*	-.015 (.026)	.022 (.026)
Authoritarianism × Retrospective egocentric	.050 (.044)	.083 (.037)*	-.040 (.035)
Authoritarianism × Prospective egocentric	.013 (.038)	.010 (.033)	.035 (.030)
Authoritarianism × Retrospective sociotropic	.016 (.034)	-.009 (.029)	-.007 (.028)
Authoritarianism × Prospective sociotropic	-.041 (.039)	-.062 (.033)#	.022 (.032)
Authoritarianism × Ideological distance	.001 (.023)	.008 (.019)	.019 (.019)
N	497	489	482
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.09	.07	.10
Cutpoint 1	-2.97 (.52)	-1.80 (.41)	-.76 (.40)
Cutpoint 2	-2.54 (.52)	-1.28 (.41)	-.01 (.39)
Cutpoint 3	-1.69 (.51)	-.50 (.41)	1.15 (.40)

\*\*p < .01, \*p < .05, #p < .10 (two-tailed).

Perhaps the effects of authoritarianism are nation specific. For instance, are authoritarian attitudes a more accepted part of political discourse in some of these nations and therefore less likely to be suppressed? Or, is the threshold for authoritarian values on our scale lower in some countries, where elites are prepared to use force to preserve democracy? We could be picking up these differences with our country dummy variables. We tested this alternative account by rerunning the models in Tables 3 and 4 with interactions between authoritarianism and the country dummies. We removed all the other interactive terms. With a total of 15 paired tests of differences per model, there are 75 tests in total. If the explanations were valid we would expect a large number of significant differences in the size of the interactions between authoritarianism

and country and that the main effects of country shown in Tables 3 and 4 would disappear.

Reestimating the models incorporating the above changes, no such pattern emerged. We found few differences in the size of interactions between authoritarianism and country (nine at p < .05) and that many of the differences in main effects did not disappear. For example, for the dependent variable in Table 3 measuring willingness to support an authoritarian government, the effect of authoritarianism for Colombians was statistically significantly different only from Chile. Moreover, most of the differences by country were due to just one of the nations, Chile, where authoritarian dispositions often had more impact. While this is an intriguing finding it does not explain away the country-specific differences we have

shown. The authoritarian attitudes we measure appear to have the same meaning across countries.

## Summary and Conclusion

This article began with three objectives: first, to gauge the levels of authoritarianism among Latin American elites and examine their relationship with attitudes toward democracy; second, to assess competing theories of the origins and effects of authoritarian attitudes using real-world data in a relatively neglected region for the study of the psychology of authoritarianism; and, third, to deepen the understanding of the scope of authoritarian effects. Beginning with the first question, surveys of Latin America, such as the United Nations study described above, often lament the fact that antidemocratic attitudes retain a hold, particularly when there is economic instability. The LAEP indicates that such an outlook, captured here by authoritarian aggression, does indeed affect attitudes not only toward order and democracy but also broader policy preferences such as toward the government's role in ensuring employment.

These results are somewhat at odds with the notion of a disconnect between antidemocratic sentiment or threat and democratic values. For example, Duch and Gibson argue that antidemocratic ideas may not signal danger to the development of the democratic value of political tolerance: "political tolerance seems to be facilitated where citizens are exposed to a wide range of political ideas—even seemingly antidemocratic ideas—and where these ideas are accorded legitimacy by at least some segments of the population" (1992, 267). We find no evidence that exposure to antidemocratic ideas, as measured by authoritarianism, *facilitates* the democratic values upon which we focused in Latin America, at least among elites. In fact, authoritarians are more likely to entertain the notion of an authoritarian alternative to democratic government. Our results also contrast with Sullivan and colleagues' (1993) evidence that political tolerance among elites is unrelated to perceptions of threat. We find that perceptions of economic threat elevate elite levels of authoritarianism and that authoritarian attitudes among elites tell us something about sympathy with the idea of an authoritarian government. We speculated at the outset that this may be a consequence of a different kind of socialization of elites in Latin America than in other nations.

The results of this research favor Altemeyer's social-learning explanation of authoritarianism. For example, we found a relationship between economic threat and levels of authoritarianism, contradicting Feldman and Stenner's argument that "Perhaps it is not authoritari-

anism itself that increases in the face of transient environmental threat, but rather the relationship between authoritarianism and its attitudinal and behavioral manifestations or consequences" (1997, 744). We also found that levels of authoritarianism affect preferences for order.

For only one economic policy preference, taxation, was there any evidence to support Feldman and Stenner's argument that authoritarianism exerts an impact only in combination with a sense of threat. Moreover, even when economic threat has an influence it differs from that postulated by Feldman and Stenner. In the one instance when we observed statistically significant interactive relationships between threat and authoritarianism, it was threat as represented by elites' individual economic circumstances that mattered more than concerns about the national economy. This is contrary to Feldman and Stenner's argument that only national economic threat activates authoritarian predispositions. We are therefore skeptical that threat activates authoritarian predispositions as opposed to simply raising levels of authoritarianism.

Finally, by examining the influence of authoritarianism on economic policy preferences we demonstrated that its impact may be more pervasive than previously considered. We also found variance in the nature of its effects. For policy that is more obviously related to a possible breakdown in social order, the impact of authoritarian attitudes is direct and not moderated by threat. For preferences whose connection to social order is less clear, taxation and economic liberalization, we saw little influence of authoritarian attitudes. To be sure, we have looked at only three economic policy preferences here, one of which encroaches on social order—our theory needs to be tested on other economic policy preferences and in other policy realms—but the results are robust and accord with our theory. Since 2003 when the survey was conducted, the general tide against neoliberal economic policies has continued to turn negative. In some Latin American countries, this has contributed to social and political instability. Should the continuation of neoliberal policies further threaten social order, the often-presumed champions of these policies, the elite, may begin to favor more, not less, government involvement.

## Appendix A

The *University of Miami/Zogby Latin American Elite Poll* surveyed leaders in government, the media, business, and academia. The survey was administered by Zogby International using the following methodology. In each country, lists were created of eligible populations of members of these four groups. Subjects were selected from

each group such that each sector was approximately equally represented in the six countries. Interviewing continued until quotas for the four groups (about 20 respondents per group) in each country were met, for a total of about 80 respondents. The response rate was about 25%.

Interviews were conducted primarily in Spanish (except in Brazil where Portuguese was used) both in person and by phone, depending on the respondent's preferences. Membership in the groups was defined as follows:

**Government:** National and local top-level public officials, consisting primarily of legislators and political party leaders.

**Media:** Editors and journalists from national and local media.

**Business:** Executive directors and top-level management of private companies (mainly large corporations).

**Academia:** Deans, heads of schools and departments, and influential faculty in public and private universities, as well as research centers.

## Appendix B

### Independent Variables

Variable	Coding/Explanation
Argentina	Coded as 1 for elites from Argentina, 0 for elites from other nations
Brazil	Coded as 1 for elites from Brazil, 0 for elites from other nations
Chile	Coded as 1 for elites from Chile, 0 for elites from other nations
Colombia	Coded as 1 for elites from Colombia, 0 for elites from other nations
Mexico	Coded as 1 for elites from Mexico, 0 for elites from other nations
Retrospective egocentric economic perceptions	Question: How does the financial situation of your household compare to what it was 12 months ago? Coded as 5-point scale from 1 (got a lot worse) through 5 (got a lot better)
Prospective egocentric economic perceptions	Question: How do you think the financial situation of your household will change over the next 12 months? Coded as 5-point scale from 1 (get a lot worse) through 5 (get a lot better)
Retrospective sociotropic economic perceptions	Question: How do you think the general economic situation in your country has changed over the last 12 months? Coded as 5-point scale from 1 (got a lot worse) through 5 (got a lot better)
Prospective sociotropic economic perceptions	Question: How do you think the general economic situation in your country will develop over the next 12 months? Coded as 5-point scale from 1 (get a lot worse) through 5 (get a lot better)
Ideological distance from president	Questions: Thinking of politics in terms of left and right, on a scale from 1 to 7, where is 1 is left, 4 center, and 7 is right, where would you place the president? Thinking of politics in terms of left and right, on a scale from 1 to 7, where is 1 is left, 4 center, and 7 is right, where would you place yourself? Coded as the absolute difference between the two scales, ranging from 0 to 6.
Ideology	Thinking of politics in terms of left and right, on a scale from 1 to 7, where is 1 is left, 4 center, and 7 is right, where would you place yourself? Coded as 7-point scale from 1 (left) to 7 (right)
Age	From 20 to 85
Female	Coded as 1 if female and 0 if male
Education	Coded as 4-point scale, from 2 (secondary), 3 (4 years of college), 4 (masters/ professional), through 5 (PhD)
Academic sector	Coded as 1 for elites in academic sector, 0 for all others
Business sector	Coded as 1 for elites in business sector, 0 for all others
Government sector	Coded as 1 for elites in government sector, 0 for all others
Authoritarianism	Questions: Suppose the government, sometime in the future, passed a law outlawing "radical" political groups in [country]. Government officials then stated that the law would only be effective if it were vigorously enforced at the local level, and appealed to every [nationality] to aid in the fight against all radical political groups. 1. I would approve of such a law. 2. I would tell my friends and neighbors it was a good law. 3. I would tell the police about any radicals I knew. 4. I would, if asked by the authorities, keep my "ears open" for any radical discussions, and report them to the police. 5. I would, if asked by the authorities, help hunt down and arrest radicals. 6. I would participate in attacks on radical headquarters led by proper authorities. 7. I would support the use of physical force to make radicals reveal the identity of other radicals. 8. I would support the execution of radical leaders if the government insisted it was necessary to protect [country]. Coded as -4 (the statement is extremely untrue of you) through 4 (the statement is extremely true of you). Recoded as a 0-6 scale, with 0 representing the lowest level of authoritarianism.

## *Dependent Variables*

Variable	Coding/Explanation
Confidence in order-maintaining institutions	Questions: How much confidence do you have in each of the following institutions? Judiciary, Police, Armed forces Coded as 1 (not at all confident) through 3 (great confidence), making a scale from 3 through 9 Cronbach's alpha = .70
Support for authoritarian government	Question: Would you ever support an authoritarian government in your country? Coded as 1 (under any circumstances) through 3 (under no circumstances)
Fair to tax rich to help poor	Question: It is fair to tax the rich to help the poor? Coded as 1 (disagree strongly) through 4 (agree strongly)
Govt. should see that everyone has a job	Question: The government should see to it that everyone has a job. Coded as 1 (disagree strongly) through 4 (agree strongly)
Economic liberalization has been good	Question: Economic liberalization has been good for the country. Coded as 1 (disagree strongly) through 4 (agree strongly)

## References

- Adorno, T., E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. Levinson, and R. Sanford. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Ajzen, Icek. 1991. "The Theory of Planned Behavior." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process* 50(2):179–210.
- Almond, Gabriel, and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Altemeyer, Bob. 1981. *Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press.
- Altemeyer, Bob. 1988. *Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Altemeyer, Bob. 1996. *The Authoritarian Specter*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bandura, Albert. 1977. "Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change." *Psychological Review* 84(2):191–215.
- Bandura, Albert. 1982. "Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency." *American Psychologist* 37(2):122–47.
- Bermeo, Nancy. 1992. "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship." *Comparative Politics* 24(3):273–91.
- Burton, Michael, Richard Gunther, and John Higley. 1992. "Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe: An Overview." In *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, ed. John Higley and Richard Gunther. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 323–48.
- Canache, Damarys. 2002. *Venezuela: Public Opinion and Protest in a Fragile Democracy*. Miami: North-South Center Press.
- Carmines, Edward, and James Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Caspi, Dan, and Mitchell Seligson. 1983. "Toward an Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Political Groups in Israel and Costa Rica." *Comparative Political Studies* 15(4):385–404.
- Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dealy, Glen Caudill. 1977. *The Public Man: An Interpretation of Latin American and Other Catholic Countries*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Sebastian Edwards, eds. 1991. *The Macroeconomics of Population in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Doty, Richard, Bill Peterson, and David Winter. 1991. "Threat and Authoritarianism in the United States: 1978–1987." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 61(4):629–40.
- Duch, Raymond, and James Gibson. 1992. "Putting Up With Fascists in Western Europe: A Comparative, Cross-Level Analysis of Political Tolerance." *Western Political Quarterly* 45(1):237–73.
- Duckitt, John. 1989. "Authoritarianism and Group Identification: A New View of an Old Construct." *Political Psychology* 10(1):63–84.
- Eldersveld, Samuel. 1989. *Political Elites in Modern Societies: Empirical Research and Democratic Theory*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Feldman, Stanley. 2003. "Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism." *Political Psychology* 24(1):41–71.
- Feldman, Stanley, and Karen Stenner. 1997. "Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism." *Political Psychology* 18(4):741–70.
- Franzese, Robert, Cindy Kam, and Amaney Jamal. 1999. *Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analyses*. Unpublished manuscript. University of Michigan.

- Fromm, Erich. 1941. *Escape from Freedom*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1994. *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Geddes, Barbara, and John Zaller. 1989. "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 33(2):319–47.
- Gibson, James. 1992. "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be 'Least-Liked'?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36(2):560–77.
- Gibson, James. 1996. "Political and Economic Markets: Changes in the Connections Between Attitudes Toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy Within the Mass Culture of Russia and Ukraine." *Journal of Politics* 58(4):954–84.
- Gibson, James, and Amanda Gouws. 2003. *Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in Democratic Persuasion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Harrison, Lawrence E. 1985. *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind: The Latin American Case*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Hill, Kim Quaille, and Patricia Hurley. 1999. "Dyadic Representation Reappraised." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(1):109–37.
- Hojman, David. 1999. "Economic Policy and Latin American Culture: Is a Virtuous Circle Possible?" *Journal of Latin American Studies* 31(1):167–90.
- Jacobs, Larry, and Robert Shapiro. 2000. *Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Johnson, Gregg, and Brian Crisp. 2003. "Mandates, Powers, and Policies." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(1):128–42.
- Kay, Stephen. 1999. "Unexpected Privatizations: Politics and Social Security Reform in the Southern Cone." *Comparative Politics* 32(4):403–22.
- Kornberg, Allan, and Harold Clarke. 1992. *Citizens and Community: Political Support in a Representative Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lavine, Howard, Milton Lodge, James Polichack, and Charles Taber. 2002. "Explicating the Black Box Through Experimentation: Studies of Authoritarianism and Threat." *Political Analysis* 10(4):343–61.
- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1978. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1981. *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics* (Expanded Edition). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Marcus, George, John Sullivan, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, and Sandra Wood. 1995. *With Malice Toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, Arthur, Vicki Hesli, and William Reisinger. 1994. "Reassessing Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in the Former USSR." *American Political Science Review* 88(2):399–411.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Pereira, Luiz Carlos Bresser. 1991. "Populism and Economic Policy in Brazil." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 33(2):1–21.
- Power, Timothy, and Mary Clark. 2001. "Does Trust Matter? Interpersonal Trust and Democratic Values in Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico." In *Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Roderic Camp. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1993. "The Neoliberal Fallacy." In *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy Revisited*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 39–53.
- Putnam, Robert. 1976. *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Rickert, Edward. 1998. "Authoritarianism and Economic Threat: Implications for Political Behavior." *Political Psychology* 19:707–20.
- Sales, Steven. 1972. "Economic Threat as a Determinant of Conversion Rates in Authoritarian and Nonauthoritarian Churches." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 23(3):420–428.
- Sales, Steven. 1973. "Threat as a Factor in Authoritarianism: An Analysis of Archival Data." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 28(1):44–57.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. 1974. "Still the Century of Corporatism?" In *The New Corporatism: Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World*, ed. Frederick Pike and Thomas Stritch. University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 85–131.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. 2005. *The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, Central America, and Colombia, 2004*. Washington: Unpublished report, USAID and Vanderbilt University, LAPOP Project.
- Smith, William. 1990. "Democracy, Distributional Conflicts and Macroeconomic Policymaking in Argentina, 1983–89." *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 32(2):1–42.
- Stein, Andrew. 1998. "The Consequences of the Nicaraguan Revolution for Political Tolerance: Explaining Differences among the Mass Public, Catholic Priests, and Secular Elites." *Comparative Politics* 30(3):335–53.
- Stouffer, Samuel, Herbert McClosky, and Ada Brill. 1983. *Dimensions of Tolerance*. New York: Basic Books.
- Sullivan, John, James Pierson, and George Marcus. 1982. *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sullivan, John, Pat Walsh, Michal Shamir, David Barnum, and James Gibson. 1993. "Why Politicians Are More Tolerant: Selective Recruitment and Socialization Among Political Elites in Britain, Israel, New Zealand and the United States." *British Journal of Political Science* 23(1):51–76.
- United Nations Development Programme News Bulletin. 2004. *Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizen's Democracy* (<http://www.undp.org/dpa/pressrelease/releases/2004/april/0421prodal.html>)
- Véliz, Claudio. 1980. *The Centralist Tradition of Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Weyland, Kurt. 2002. *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wiarda, Howard J. 2002. *The Soul of Latin America: The Cultural and Political Tradition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.